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POPPER ON NECESSITY AND NATURAL LAWS
ABSTRACT: During his philosophical career Popper sought to characterize natural laws alter-
nately as strictly universal and as ‘naturally’ or ‘physically’ necessary statements. In this paper
we argue that neither characterization does what Popper claimed and sketch a reconstruction
of his views that avoids some of their major drawbacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
What distinguishes natural laws from merely ‘accidental’ generalizations?
During his philosophical career Popper provided two answers to this long-
debated question. The first claims that the difference between the two kinds
of universal statements does not involve any more than the definition of their
constitutive terms. The second claims that laws of nature are in some sense
‘necessary’. The first answer was put forward in The Logic of Scientific Dis-
covery (henceforth LSD), in particular §§13–15, and in a short paper pub-
lished in 1949.1 The second was proposed in Appendix *x to the 1959 edition
of LSD.2 Although these answers may seem incompatible, Popper has main-
tained that, under certain metaphysical assumptions, they are equivalent.
In this paper we shall comment on both Popper’s first and second answer
(henceforth referred to as the Old and the New Characterization, respec-
tively) and their alleged equivalence. In particular, we shall argue that the
Old Characterization fails to provide a basis for any distinction at all be-
tween laws of nature and merely accidental generalizations, while the New
Characterization succeeds, but at the price of making laws of nature logically
necessary and thus indistinguishable from mere tautologies. Furthermore,
we shall provide a reconstruction of Popper’s views which, in our opinion,
avoids these drawbacks.
2. STRICT AND NUMERICAL UNIVERSALITY
Popper’s Old Characterization explains the difference between laws of nature
and mere universal statements as a distinction between strict and numerical
universality. According to Popper, a statement of the form “For all x, if x is a
P, then x is a Q" is said to be ‘numerically universal” if P is so defined as to be
coextensive with “x is either a, or b, or c, . . . ", where a,b, c, . . . are thought of
as names for the elements of the class selected by P. Otherwise it is said to be
“strictly universal”. Thus a strictly universal statement must not be logically
Mario Alai and Gino Tarozzi (eds)
Karlo Popper Philosopher of Science
Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2006. Pages 107–118.
108 Artosi and Governatori
equivalent to “For all x, if x is either a, or b, or c,. . . , then x is a Q”, and thus
to the finite conjunction of singular statements “Qa∧Qb∧Qc, . . .”. This would
explain the difference between a universal law of nature such as
[S1] All gases expand when heated under constant pressure
and a merely accidental universal such as
[S2] All my friends speak French.
This would also explain why the distinction between laws of nature and
merely accidental generalizations cannot be simply accounted for in terms
of subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals. For a subjunctive conditional
such as
[C1] If x were one of the P’s (i.e. either a, or b, or c, . . . ), then it would
be a Q
follows from a strict as well as a numerical universal, while a subjunctive
conditional such as
[C2] Is x were added to the P’s, then it would be a Q
can only follow from a strict universal. The reason for this is that, in the
antecedent of [C1], P retains the same extension it has in the corresponding
numerical universal, while in the antecedent of [C2] it is assumed that this
extension may change, which obviously makes the inference from a numeri-
cally universal statement invalid. (To see this, consider that the extension of
P in a numerically universal statement is restricted, and thus in some sense
‘closed’, while in a strictly universal statement it is unrestricted, and thus in
some sense ‘open’ to the addition of further elements of the same kind of P).
This accounts for the fact that, for example, from [S2] it follows intuitively
[C3] If Confucius were a friend of mine, then he would speak French
in the sense of
[C4] If Confucius were (identical with) one of my friends, then he would
speak French
but not in the sense of
[C5] If Confucius were added to my friends, then he would speak French.
So far so good. But what about the following statements?
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[S3] All planets in our planetary system move in ellipses round the sun
[S4] All the coins in my pocket are silver.
They are both formulated as numerical universals. This notwithstanding, we
feel that [S3] is a genuine law of nature, while [S4] is a statement of a merely
accidental state of affairs. In effect, according to Popper’s suggestion (NLC,
64) we may interpret the term “planet of our planetary system” in [S3] in
such a way as to make it a law of nature in accordance with our intuition.
This can be achieved, for example, by interpreting “planet in our planetary
system” as referring (not to the class of the x’s which are either Mercury, or
Venus, or Earth, or Mars, etc., but) to the class of the x’s which are “planets”
in all planetary systems similar to our own. Unfortunately, there seem to be
no reasons why we could not do the same with the term “coin in my pocket”
in [S4], thus making it a law of nature, in contrast to our intuition.
Popper would obviously proscribe such a possibility, for according to his
own explicit criterion (NLC, 65), for any universal statement S and univer-
sal term P in it, if S is a strictly universal law, then P can be interpreted,
in the antecedent of the corresponding subjunctive conditional C, either as
in [C1] or as in [C2]; while if S is a, accidental or numerically universal
statement, then Pmust be interpreted, in the antecedent of C, as in C1. Oth-
erwise, if we interpret P in such a way as to make its extension unrestricted
(as in [C2]) we make the inference of C invalid, as it should be.
It should be noted that, on Popper’s criterion, the interpretation we as-
sign to P in the antecedent of C closely depends on our knowing whether S
is either a strict or a numerical universal. On the other hand, according to
this criterion, the distinction between being a law of nature or a mere uni-
versal statement is exactly the sort of thing we can know only by analyzing
the ‘structure’ of P (NLC, 65). Thus Popper’s criterion fails to distinguish
statements of laws from statements of merely accidental universality, for it
presupposes the very distinction it should characterize.
3. FROM UNIVERSALITY TO NECESSITY
The Old Characterization refers only to “the extensional or class-aspect” of
the terms (NLC, 64)3 and, according to Popper, makes any explanation of
the logical peculiarities of natural laws in terms of a modal distinction be-
tween statements of necessity and statements of merely accidental univer-
sality quite superfluous. Later on, under the influence of Kneale’s criticisms,4
he realized that natural laws are logically stronger than strictly universal
statements (LSD, 426). Accordingly, Popper turned to the view that his Old
Characterization was neither logically sufficient nor intuitively adequate and
that it was “quite possible and perhaps even useful” (LSD, 428) to speak of
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the kind of necessity which is manifested in the form of strictly universal
natural laws as a sort of ‘natural’ or ‘physical’ necessity. Popper proposed the
following definition for this kind of necessity (LSD, 433):
(N0) A statement may be said naturally or physically necessary if, and only if, it is deducible
from a statement function which is satisfied in all worlds that differ from our world, if at all,
only with respect to initial conditions
where “initial conditions” is the term used by Popper to refer to singular con-
tingent facts. This definition amounts, intuitively, to characterizing natural
laws as those statements which hold true in all worlds whatever the initial
conditions may be, which obviously means in all worlds that share the same
natural laws as our own. This circularity makes no trouble, however, since,
as Popper remarks, the above definition
operates with a perfectly clear intuitive idea — that of varying the initial conditions of our
world. . . . It interprets the result of such changes as the construction of a kind of ‘model’ of our
world. . . and then imitates the well-known device of calling those statements ‘necessary’ which
are true in. . . all these models (LSD, 435–36).
According to Popper this “device” should define natural or physical necessity
as a form of necessity basically distinct from ‘ordinary’ logical necessity and
capable of guaranteeing the necessity of natural laws without obliterating
their empirical and contingent character.5 What Popper seems unaware of
is that the “well-known device” he appeals to can hardly be said to define a
notion of physical necessity basically distinct from its purely logical counter-
part. In fact, his definition (N0) is nothing but one of the traditional (and
unsuccessful) attempts to define physical necessity as a sort of ‘relative’ or
‘conditional’ version of logical necessity, that is necessity conditional on the
assumption that certain conditions are satisfied (necessity ex hypothesi, as
Leibniz called it). To put it more formally, Popper’s definition lies more or
less in the following scheme:
A statement is necessarily true relative to a set of statements T if and only if
it is true in all possible worlds in which T holds.
Presumably what, in Popper’s view, what would prevent this kind of defini-
tion from collapsing into the usual definition of logical necessity (or validity)
as truth in all possible worlds, is the fact that it refers not to all possible
worlds, but to all possible worlds that are assumed to differ from our own
only in initial conditions. This may lead one to feel that what has been de-
fined is a separate form of necessity; but this is not the case.6 We can prove
it by recasting Popper’s definition (N0) in the standard language of possible-
worlds semantics. In this case we may interpret the usual accessibility (or
‘alternativeness’) relation in such a way as to make two worlds accessible
(‘alternative’) to each other if and only if they obey the same physical laws.7
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Obviously, on Popper’s own conception, the actual world will be accessible to
itself (otherwise how could we ever hope to falsify a law of nature?). Thus by
suitably delimiting (by a linguistic fiat) the set of relevant possibilities, we
can call those statements ‘physically’ necessary which hold in all the worlds
accessible (physically alternative) to our own. In this perspective, Popper’s
definition (N0) may be rewritten as
(N0)′ a`T 2S⇔∀w : aRw |=w T
where T is the “appropriate theory”,8 a stands for the actual world and R
denotes the relation to its physical alternatives. We can now prove that (N0)
turns out to be equivalent to the usual definition of logical necessity. In fact,
since each world is accessible to itself, we have
(1) a`T 2S→ S;
which, together with the left member of (N0)′ leads to
(2) a`T S.
It is worth noting that, in a `T 2S we do not make use of the initial condi-
tions (see section 5. for an explanation). Thus, from (2) we get
(3) `T S.
From this, by the usual soundness result, we obtain
(4) |=T S
from which it follows
(5) |=T→ S,
and finally we get
(6) |=w S.
On the other hand, from (3) by the following theorem
THEOREM. For any consistent theory T, T ` A,⇔∀Tmax : A ∈ Tmax, where
Tmax denotes a maximal consistent extension of T9
we obtain
(7) S ∈Cn(T),
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where Cn(T) denotes the consequence class of T, for all S’s such that, for
each maximal consistent extension of T
(8) Tmax ` S;
but each w is a maximal consistent extension of T, whence
(9) |=w T.
We have thus proved that
(N0)′′ a`T 2S⇔∀w : aRw |=w S,
which expresses the usual semantic condition for logical necessity, and Pop-
per’s N0, are equivalent.
We have argued that Popper’s attempt to define a notion of natural ne-
cessity basically distinct from logical necessity is as unsuccessful as most
(perhaps all) similar attempts. As far as Popper is concerned, this failure
is quite serious for it calls into question the role he assigns to his definition
(N0) in accounting for the necessary character of natural laws. For we agree
with Popper that it is only workable as a “negative criterion” to show “by
finding initial conditions under which the supposed law turns out to be in-
valid. . . that it was not necessary; that is to say, not a law of nature” (LSD,
433). Yet it should be clear that if we do not succeed in distinguishing those
statements which are supposed to be necessarily true in the sense of natural
or physical necessity (and thus still falsifiable according to Popper’s method-
ological standards) from those which are necessarily true in the sense of log-
ical necessity (i.e. logically or analytically true), then this is bound to remain
wishful thinking, causing great trouble for the falsificationist.
4. ON THE EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW
CHARACTERIZATION
According to Popper, the Old and the New Characterization differ only in the
emphasis the former places on a “metaphysical assumption” which, at the
end of NLC, he formulates as the
general principle stating that every kind of event that is compatible with the accepted natural
laws does in fact occur in some (finite) space-time region (NLC, 66).
Popper appeals again to this principle in Appendix *x where it is referred to
as
the supposition that all logically possible initial conditions (and therefore all events and pro-
cesses which are compatible with the laws) are somewhere, at some time, realized in the world
Popper on Necessity and Natural Laws 113
to wit that
our world. . . comprises all physically possible worlds, in the sense that all physically possible
initial conditions are realized in it — somewhere, at some time (LSD, 436).
Popper thinks he has eliminated this “metaphysical assumption” from his
New Characterization by appealing to “the idea of all worlds that differ (if
at all) from our world only with respect to the initial conditions”. Yet “once
this metaphysical assumption is adopted” the Old and the New Characteriza-
tion “become (except for purely terminological differences) equivalent, as far
as the status of laws is concerned” (LSD, 436). The “metaphysical assump-
tion” which should make the Old and the New Characterization equivalent
is, of course, the venerable metaphysical tenet Arthur O. Lovejoy labelled
“the Principle of Plenitude”10 which goes together with the so-called “statis-
tical interpretation of modality”.11 This interpretation is deeply involved in
any attempt to reduce necessity to extensional terms by defining it in terms
of universality, for example in Bertrand Russell’s contention that necessity
is an attribute of propositional functions of which those are necessarily true
that are satisfied by all values of their arguments.12 Now just before his def-
inition (N0) Popper writes:
As Tarski has shown, it is possible to explain logical necessity in terms of universality: a state-
ment may be said to be logically necessary if and only if it is deducible (for example, by particu-
larization) from a ‘universally valid’ statement function; that it to say, from a statement function
which is satisfied by every model. (This means, true in all possible worlds). I think that we may
explain by the same method what we mean by natural necessity . . . (LSD, 432).
Thus Popper’s definition (N0) would be meant as a sort of extensional re-
duction of natural necessity to universality in the wake of Tarski’s reduction
of logical necessity to universality. This, we may suppose, in Popper’s view
should argue again for the superfluity of modal notions, for as he emphasizes
I regard . . . necessary as a mere word, as a label, for distinguishing the universality of laws
from accidental universality. Of course any other label would do as well, for there is not much
connection here with logical necessity (LSD, 438).
But what, then, about the phrase “This means, true in all possible worlds”
that Popper clearly appends as an explanation of the Tarskian “satisfied
by every model”? As Kneale rightly remarked, in Tarski’s explanation the
(statistically interpreted) modal notions refer to realizations in the actual
world and thus, despite Popper’s explicit intentions, his proposed explana-
tion is “an explanation of the Leibnizian type”,13— indeed of the Kripkean
type. For, as we have shown above, not only Popper clearly operates with the
kind of interpretation of modality codified in what is now generally known
as ‘possible-world semantics’ but, far from there being “not much connection
here with logical necessity”, what he achieves by its definition (N0) is not a
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reduction of necessity to universality but of physical to logical necessity. On
the other hand it should be clear that, although there is nothing in the kind of
‘possible-world’ approach to the logic of necessity which demands that our (or
any) world should sometime be actual, once this is assumed the Old and the
New Characterization become equivalent as far as the status of laws qua uni-
versal statement is concerned, which means that the New Characterization
would suffer from the same failure to distinguish natural laws from merely
accidental generalizations.14 So if we take Popper’s approach seriously the
only way of distinguishing natural laws from mere universal statements is
by making natural laws necessary in the sense of logical necessity.
5. A (PARTIAL) REHABILITATION OF POPPER’S TWO
CHARACTERIZATIONS
As we saw in Section 2 Popper’s Old Characterization relies (though circu-
larly) on the idea of using subjunctive conditionals for establishing whether
a universal statement S is a natural law or a merely accidental universal.
As a first step towards ‘rehabilitating’ this criterion from the criticisms we
put forward in Section 2 we recast it tentatively as follows. Let, as before P
be the universal term on which the interpretation of S depends, and C the
corresponding subjunctive conditional. Thus
S may be said to be a law of nature if and only if C follows from S under
the interpretation of P’s extension in the antecedent of C as an unrestricted
(‘open’) class.
and
S may be said to be a statement of accidental universality if and only if C
follows from S only under the interpretation of P’s extension in the antecedent
of C as a restricted (‘closed’) class.
For the sake of our argument, we need the concept of being T-demonstrable
(or being a T-theorem), where T = 〈B,R〉, B and R being a set of ‘axioms’ and
a set of rules of inference, respectively. For convenience we shall refer to T
as a ‘theory’ and to B as its ‘base’. If we wish, we can conceive of B as the set
of fundamental principles or ‘laws’ of T (we shall assume, as usual, that they
are statements of the form “For all x, if x is a P, then x is a Q”). On this basis
we can define the notion of “being a law of nature relative to T” as follows:
S may be said to be a law of nature relative to T if and only if the consequent
of C is T-demonstrable, under the additional assumption of the truth of the
antecedent, for the interpretation of P’s extension as an unrestricted (‘open’)
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class. Otherwise, S is a mere statement of accidental universality.
In this sense, for example, [S3] would turn out to be a law of nature relative
to a theory T including the fundamental laws of celestial mechanics, for we
may suppose that the consequent of the following subjunctive conditional
[C6] If the moon were a planet in our planetary system, then it would
move in ellipses round the sun
would turn out to be T-demonstrable under the additional assumption that
the moon is a planet (the antecedent of [C4]) via the usual definition of
“planet” as
[D1] An opaque celestial body which moves around a star and is illumi-
nated by it
which implies that we interpreted the extension of the term “planet of our
planetary system” in the antecedent of [C4] as an unrestricted class. On the
other hand [S2] would turn out to be an accidental or numerically univer-
sal relative to a theory T ′, for we may suppose that the consequent of [C3]
would not be T ′-demonstrable under the additional assumption that Confu-
cius is a friend of mine; although also [C3] turns out to be an analytically
true statement under the appropriate theory.
Now let C be the class of all subjunctive conditionals corresponding to a
universal statement S. Let us denote by A and B respectively the class of
the antecedents and consequents of C, and by d(A i) the class of elements d
in the domain D such that A i(d). For example, in the case of [S3] we may
assume that d(A i) is the class of celestial bodies we call “planets”. We are
thus able to say that
(L0) S may be said to be a law of nature if and only if
(10) d(A i)∪ {x}`T−Ci Bi(x)
for an appropriate theory T; otherwise, i.e. if it holds
(11) d(A i)∪ {x} 6`T−Ci Bi(x)
S is a statement of accidental or numerical universality.
(L0) makes explicit, in an obvious manner, the idea that a law of nature, as
opposed to a mere numerical universal, is not bound by the extension of its
domain. It is important to note that the universal statements which are to be
characterized as laws of nature according to (L0) are the same that turn out
to be naturally or physically necessary according to (N0). In other worlds, if
we denote by N the class of naturally or physically necessary statements we
have, for any universal statement Si,
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(12) d(A i)∪ {x}`T−Ci Bi(x)⇔ Si ∈N
and, in this sense, the Old and the New Characterization “become . . . equiva-
lent, as far as the status of laws is concerned”— even though this sense is not
that meant by Popper. In fact, the equivalence between (L0) and (N0)’ implies,
via the construction of a Lindenbaummaximal consistent set which produces
canonical models, that in a perspective such as Popper’s all natural laws are
logically necessary, and no law (i.e., no T-theorem) could be falsified — if
not, perhaps, accidentally — while Popper himself claimed that a ‘genuine
theory’ must provide theoretical grounds for its falsification. However, this
is possible, in a true Popperian spirit, only by rejecting the ‘mono-theoretical’
view underlying his explanation of natural necessity15 and by assuming a
‘constellation’ of theories together with some method for comparing them.
A method of this kind could consist in assuming a plurality of theories,
even with different rules of inference, as our ‘possible worlds’ and making
them accessible through their bases. This idea may be formalized as follows.
Two theories T1 = 〈B1,R1〉 and T2 = 〈B2,R2〉 are said to be accessible to each
other if and only if PB1 ∩PB2 6= ;, where PBi denotes the set of literals of
Ti; this accounts for Popper’s idea of “differing, if at all, only with respect to
initial conditions”. On this basis a statement S may be said to be “naturally”
or “physically” necessary if and only if `Ti S for all theories Ti.
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